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CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CURIOSITIES: 
WHEN LOGIC AND PROPORTION HAVE 
FALLEN SLOPPY DEAD 
Randolph N. Jonakait 
I. THE TRIAL RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN 
This symposium title’s use of “curioser” reminded me that I 
had put aside a draft labeled “The Curious Notion that the Sixth 
Amendment Constitutionalized the Trial Rights of Englishmen.” 
I was referring to Justice Scalia’s opinion in the confrontation 
case of Giles v. California, which stated: 
It is not the role of the courts to extrapolate from the 
words of the Sixth Amendment to the values behind it, 
and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they 
serve (in the courts’ views) those underlying values. The 
Sixth Amendment seeks fairness indeed–but seeks it 
through very specific means . . . that were the trial rights 
of Englishmen.1  
This interpretive fundament is similar to what Scalia said for the 
Court in Crawford v. Washington: the Confrontation Clause “is 
most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at 
common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the 
time of the founding.”2 The Giles assertion, however, differs 
from the earlier statement: it does not confine itself to the 
Confrontation Clause but gives a principle for all the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees. And Scalia seems to be indicating some 
sort of interpretive shift, for the “trial rights of Englishmen” is 
not synonymous with the common law. But if there is a shift, 
                                                          
 Professor, New York Law School. 
1 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008). 
2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
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what does it mean? Giles gave no explanation for the change, 
and I realized that I could only speculate about the significance, 
if any, of the newer formulation. Curious, I mused, and my 
thoughts, apparently like those of Robert Pitler, who organized 
this symposium, turned to Lewis Carroll’s Alice. I, being of a 
certain age, however, also thought of the Alice mediated through 
the Jefferson Airplane.3 Grace Slick seemed to be speaking to 
me. If I wanted to know the significance of the differences in 
the assertions in Crawford and Giles, I could only “Go ask 
[Scalia], when he’s ten feet tall.”4 
The curious might have further questions, such as what is 
the constitutional source of Scalia’s Giles pronouncement? It was 
unadorned with references or citations. That nakedness is not 
surprising for, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no one in 
the framing era said that the Sixth Amendment was meant to 
guarantee the trial rights of Englishmen or the common law.5 
The Giles’ statement is in the curious position of being, 
charitably, a self-evident proposition or, less charitably, a bare 
assertion. 
The notion that the Sixth Amendment seeks fairness through 
the specific means of the trial rights of Englishmen is also 
curious, if not mystifying, since it is simply flat out wrong. At 
the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights, England permitted 
                                                          
3 The lyrics to the Jefferson Airplane song White Rabbit can be found at 
various places online. See, e.g., White Rabbit, LYRICSDOMAIN, http://www. 
lyricsdomain.com/10/jefferson_airplane/white_rabbit.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2012). 
4 Id. 
5 See Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for 
Confrontation Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 83 (2005) (“English 
common law may be more accessible or more well-defined than American 
common law, but Justice Scalia’s survey of the historical record did not 
provide any evidence that the original meaning was tied to English common 
law. There is no mention of English common law in the statements from the 
ratification debates quoted by Justice Scalia.”); see also Robert N. Clinton, 
The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in 
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 735–38 (1976) (“[I]t is remarkable that 
there was so little debate [about the Sixth Amendment.] . . . [T]he historical 
background of the Bill of Rights leaves unclear the intent of the Framers of 
the [F]ifth and [S]ixth amendments.”). 
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counsel for misdemeanors and by statute in treason cases. For 
ordinary felonies, however, an accused could have counsel for 
issues of law—and perhaps at the indulgence of the court, 
lawyers could cross-examine witnesses—but such defendants 
were prohibited from having the full assistance of counsel.6  
Americans of the framing era saw this limitation as 
inhumane and cruel, and the Sixth Amendment’s grant of a full 
right of counsel to all those charged with crimes was a conscious 
rejection of English law. For example, James Wilson, a drafter 
of the Constitution and an original Supreme Court Justice, 
criticized the English law: “The practice in England is admitted 
to be a hard one, and not to be very consonant to the rest of the 
humane treatment of prisoners by the English law.”7 In contrast, 
he wrote, “It is enacted by a law of the United States that 
persons indicted for crimes shall be allowed to make their full 
defense by counsel learned in the law.”8 
Zephaniah Swift, who later served as Chief Justice of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, was even harsher in his assessment 
of the English law and Connecticut’s rejection of it. In his 
treatise published in 1796, he wrote: 
We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle 
of the common law of England, that when a man is on 
trial for his life, he shall be refused counsel, and denied 
those means of defence, which are allowed, when the 
most trifling pittance of property is in question. The 
flimsy pretence, that the court are to be counsel for the 
prisoner will only heighten our indignation at the 
practice; for it is apparent to the least consideration, that 
a court can never furnish a person accused of the crime 
with the advice, and assistance necessary to make his 
defence. . . . One cannot read without horror and 
astonishment, the abominable maxims of law, which 
                                                          
6 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: 
America Before England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 324–25 (2009) 
(discussing the right to counsel in eighteenth century England). 
7 JAMES WILSON, THE WORK OF JAMES WILSON 472 (James DeWitt 
Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896). 
8 Id. 
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deprive persons accused, and on trial for crimes, of the 
assistance of counsel . . . . It seems by the ancient 
practice, that whenever a person was accused of a crime, 
every expedient was adopted to convict him, and every 
privilege denied him, to prove his innocence. . . . 
The legislature has become so thoroughly convinced of 
the impropriety and injustice of shackling and restricting 
a prisoner with respect to his defence, that they have 
abolished all those odious laws, and every person when 
he is accused of a crime, is entitled to every possible 
privilege in make his defence, and manifesting his 
innocence, by the instrumentality of counsel . . . .9 
Swift, writing a few years after the Sixth Amendment’s 
ratification, saw the American right to counsel as an important 
rejection of what were then the limited trial rights of Englishmen.  
It is clear that the Sixth Amendment rejected that then-
existing English law. Even so, Scalia, in Giles, asserts that the 
Sixth Amendment sought fairness through the trial rights of 
Englishmen. How could the Supreme Court Justices be so 
clearly wrong? We seem to be in Alice’s world, where 
following the rabbit leads down the rabbit hole of someone’s 
imagination. And how is one to understand this imaginary 
history? Grace Slick’s voice returns, “Call [Scalia], when he 
was just small.” 
II. THE MYTH OF RALEIGH’S TRIAL 
Those going down the confrontation rabbit hole tend to spy 
Sir Walter Raleigh. His trial, even if not the wellspring of the 
confrontation right, is seen as emblematic of the kind of 
proceedings the Confrontation Clause was meant to prohibit. 
Justice Scalia stated what many believe when he said that 
“Raleigh’s infamous 17th-century treason trial . . . remains the 
canonical example of a Confrontation Clause violation. . . .”10 
                                                          
9 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT 398–99 (Nabu Press 2011) (1796). 
10 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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But as Professor David Alan Sklansky points out, for Raleigh’s 
case to guide us today, “[w]e need to decide precisely what was 
wrong with it. . . .”11 At this point, however, the vision 
becomes obscured, perhaps by the smoke from the tobacco that 
the sometime-historian Bob Newhart suggests Raleigh brought 
back to Europe.12 The haze prevents answers to some basic 
questions: “Was confrontation so important because Cobham had 
provided key evidence against Raleigh, because Cobham was in 
Crown custody, because Cobham reportedly had retracted his 
incriminating statements,” or some combination of these 
procedures?13 
Such questions are based on the presupposition that the trial 
was seen as unfair because of the way that the prosecution 
presented evidence. But surely there are other reasons why the 
trial could be perceived as unjust: perhaps it was because 
Raleigh was without a defense advocate, apparently could not 
call witnesses of his own, and could not call Cobham. Maybe it 
was unjust because Raleigh did not have notice of the charges or 
the evidence before the trial, there was no neutral magistrate, 
the trial was not public, or because the trial, and the time it took 
place, were filled with religious intolerance. Later generations 
could have found various reasons for why Raleigh’s trial was 
unjust, and the evidence we now call hearsay was just one of 
many interrelated reasons. 
Of course, these more modern answers to the question of 
why Raleigh’s trial was historically seen as unjust are not really 
the point. Instead, we should want to know what the framers 
and adopters of the Constitution thought the answers were. This 
we do not know. We do not know if the question was even 
posed. Indeed, nothing has been presented that people of the 
framing era, whether actually involved with crafting our 
Constitution or not, gave Raleigh’s trial any thought at all. Even 
if we accept the unsupported supposition that Raleigh’s trial was 
                                                          
11 David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 
1690 (2009). 
12 See, e.g., Introducing Tobacco to Civilization, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kO1nCuVQIeg (last visited Feb. 13, 
2012). 
13 Sklansky, supra note 11, at 1690. 
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seen in the framing era as a canonical example of an unfair trial, 
we do not know why. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOSEN MYTH  
Perhaps we all need a myth to lean on, but the one we 
choose can matter. Somehow the notion that the Confrontation 
Clause was meant to prevent trials like Raleigh’s leads to the 
conclusion that the Clause’s prime concern is with the use of ex 
parte depositions from absent witnesses. If, however, the Salem 
witch trials had been picked as exemplars of the unfairness that 
the Sixth Amendment sought to prevent, the focus would be 
different. Certainly, in some ways, the Salem trials are a better 
choice than Raleigh’s trial. While we do not have any indication 
that Raleigh’s trial got any real consideration from Americans, 
we do know that the Salem trials had widespread notoriety. 
The witch trials were quickly, widely, and consistently 
perceived as unjust. In print, correspondence, and no doubt in 
public and private discourse, colonial Americans pondered the 
mistakes. No colonial trials were examined more. The consensus 
concluded that injustices were committed, even though existing 
law and procedures had been followed. Something, then, had to 
be wrong with the law and procedures, and consequently 
pressures for change and reform emerged from these trials.14 
If these trials formed part of the Sixth Amendment’s origin 
myth, as they well could, then the focus of the Confrontation 
Clause doctrine would be different from that adopted by the 
Court, since the  
flaws at Salem did not come from the lack of face-to-face 
confrontation. Face-to-face confrontation was not only 
granted, it was crucial to many of the proceedings. The 
secret generation of evidence by the state did not occur. 
The proceedings, including the preliminary examinations, 
were very public. Ex parte depositions were not used. 
The trials relied heavily on evidence adduced at 
preliminary examinations, but both the accused and the 
                                                          
14 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An 
Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 127–28 (1995). 
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accuser were present at them. If those examinations can 
be labeled depositions, they were not ex parte.15 
Analysis of the Salem trials continued at least into the mid-
eighteenth century. In 1750 Thomas Hutchinson, who later would 
be governor of Massachusetts, published documents from the witch 
trials along with a commentary. He concluded that the trials were 
unfair even though the accusers faced the accused in open court 
and even though the trials were not based on depositions. The 
proceedings were “absurd and dangerous,” at least in part because 
“[i]nstead of suspecting and shifting the witnesses, and suffering 
them to be cross-examined, the authority, to say no more, were 
imprudent in making use of leading questions, and thereby putting 
words into their mouths for suffering others to do it.”16  
IV. THE CURIOUS LIMITATION ON THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT 
The Court’s choice of myth has led to the conclusion that the 
Confrontation Clause’s purpose was to prevent ex parte 
depositions and, therefore, courts must prevent the modern 
equivalents of such evidence. The result has been, as the next 
section discusses, the Court’s increasingly Mad-Hatterish 
discussion of what is “testimonial” hearsay. But even if the 
Court has selected the correct myth and correctly pronounced 
the Confrontation Clause’s purpose, the Court has made an 
analytic leap by concluding that the constitutional right operates 
only when un-cross-examined testimonial evidence is presented. 
Perhaps the Framers did want to prevent ex parte depositions, 
but that does not necessarily mean that their selected method—
the confrontation right—only applies when the equivalent of an 
ex parte deposition occurs. It is possible that the Framers were 
adopting a right like other Sixth Amendment provisions that 
prevent specific abuses by giving an affirmative right that 
applies generally and is not limited to the animating harm. 
                                                          
15 Id. at 128–29. 
16 Thomas Hutchinson, History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 
reprinted in THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE 15, 18–19 (Donald S. Thomas ed., 
1972); see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere 
Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 621 n.24 (1992) 
(discussion of Hutchinson’s comments on Salem witch trials.). 
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For example, the jury trial provision of the Sixth 
Amendment was created, according to the Supreme Court, to 
prevent government oppression. “Providing an accused with the 
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable 
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”17 If this right 
were interpreted as confrontation is, the Court would give 
standards for determining the presence of a corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor or a compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge and limit jury trials to these situations. The Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right acts as a check on such judges and 
prosecutors, but the guarantee applies generally and even in the 
established absence of an abusive prosecutor or judge in the 
particular trial.  
Even if the Confrontation Clause’s birth was prompted by a 
specific abuse, its text, like that of the jury guarantee, is not 
expressly limited to restraining a particular pernicious practice. 
Just as the jury right operates generally and protects an accused 
even if the right’s animating harm is not present, the 
confrontation right, even if opposition to ex parte depositions 
gave a reason for its birth, could grant an accused rights even 
when the concern regarding ex parte depositions is irrelevant. 
Surely, it ought to be at least considered curious that the Court 
has not explained why the Confrontation Clause should operate 
differently, or in a more limited manner, from other Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
V. CONFRONTATION’S IDIOSYNCRATIC TERMS 
Of course, for those most truly affected by the Confrontation 
Clause—the lawyers seeking to admit or exclude evidence, the 
judges who must decide if the evidence is admissible, and the 
defendants whose lives will be irrevocably changed by the 
decisions—the important point is not how the Court got where it 
is, but whether some specific hearsay is “testimonial.” 
The formal definition seems clear. Justice Sotomayor, 
                                                          
17 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968). 
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writing for the Court in Michigan v. Bryant, relied on the 
definition in Davis v. Washington18 that statements “are 
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate . . . that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”19 
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg dissented and Justice Kagan did 
not participate in Bryant, but Scalia and Kagan both joined in 
the portion of Ginsburg’s opinion in Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
that stated, “To rank as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a 
‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”20 Justice 
Thomas, too, may agree with this definition, but he is the 
outlier because he maintains that the confrontation right only 
applies when testimonial evidence is somehow “formal.”21 
While the Court may have a consensus on the definition of 
“testimonial,” the Court’s fractured decisions reveal that the 
Justices differ on how the term applies. This is hardly 
unexpected. The term “testimonial hearsay” does not appear in 
the Constitution. It is not a term used in the framing era, nor 
can it be found in English common law. It is not a term used 
in Raleigh’s trial. In fact, it was not used in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, or twentieth centuries. It is a new term, first coined 
in the Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington22 in 2004, 
without a history of interpretation, and it should not be 
surprising that this ahistorical, atextual term is malleable. 
Indeed, many of the terms used in the present 
                                                          
18 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
19 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154 (2011) (quoting Davis, 
547 U.S. at 822). 
20 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 n.6 (2011) 
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
21 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to adhere to my position that ‘the 
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as 
they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’” (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
22 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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Confrontation Clause doctrine have idiosyncratic meanings.23 
This includes, for example, Scalia’s dissenting statement in 
Bryant that “[r]eliability tells us nothing about whether a 
statement is testimonial. Testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements alike come in varying degrees of reliability.”24 Scalia 
then offers an illustration. “An eyewitness’s statements to the 
police after a fender-bender, for example, are both reliable and 
testimonial. Statements to the police from one driver attempting 
to blame the other would be similarly testimonial but rarely 
reliable.”25  
Even if Justice Scalia is correct that “reliability” should not 
be part of the testimonial analysis, his use of the term 
“reliability” is distinctive. Surely if the eyewitness or that driver 
testified in court consistently with what was told the officer, the 
jury, after considering other evidence and hearing cross-
examination, might correctly rely on either the driver or the 
eyewitness, or both. The driver that Scalia deems rarely reliable 
may be giving an absolutely accurate rendition of what 
happened. Just because she was involved in the accident does 
not mean she was not telling the truth. And, of course, other 
evidence and cross-examination may reveal the eyewitness’s 
statement—which Scalia presumed reliable—to be inaccurate. A 
“reliable statement,” as Scalia conceives of it here, is not one 
that ultimately can be relied upon, but one made by a person 
who does not have an obvious motive to shade the truth. But a 
witness’s motives, credibility, and bias are elements that are 
traditionally adduced by the finder of fact at a trial. Thus, 
reliability, Scalia suggests, can be determined without the 
information that only a trial can produce.  
Scalia’s use of “eyewitness,” however, may seem even more 
curious. He posits that the eyewitness’s statements are 
testimonial because, apparently, the eyewitness’s assertions had 
the primary purpose of proving past events potentially relevant 
                                                          
23 I explore some of these terms in Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in 
the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and 
Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155 (2006). 
24 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175. 
25 Id. 
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to a criminal case. As the Court has come to define the term, 
this eyewitness would be a “witness against” the accused if his 
statements were offered by the prosecution. Consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause, such hearsay could be admitted only if 
the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
eyewitness. But if that eyewitness had made the very same 
statement to a non-law enforcement official, such as a spouse 
or a bystander, apparently the statement would be 
nontestimonial. Since the eyewitness has not made a testimonial 
statement, the eyewitness does not bear testimony, and the 
Confrontation Clause would not bar introduction of such 
statements. The very same words that could not be admitted 
when said to the police, except under cross-examination, now 
could be. Why? Because under confrontation terminology, the 
“eyewitness” is no longer a “witness.” In this curious world 
that a Lewis Carroll might appreciate, words have lost their 
normal English meanings. 
This result, again, suggests that the Confrontation Clause is 
interpreted differently from its companion rights. The Sixth 
Amendment does not merely restrain the government. Instead, it 
acts as a check on official power by granting affirmative rights 
to an accused: 
[T]he Sixth Amendment is not a collection of negatives. 
Instead, the provision grants positive guarantees to the 
accused. The controlling question is not what did the 
government do, but what did the defendant get. Did he 
get a jury? Did he get an attorney? Did he get notice? 
Did he get the chance to produce witnesses? and so on.26 
The Confrontation Clause operates differently. It is not viewed 
from the accused’s perspective. While the accused could benefit 
similarly from cross-examination of an out-of-court declarant 
whether a statement is made to a bystander or a police officer, 
he only gets the constitutional protection, apparently, if law 
enforcement was involved. Present interpretation, in effect, 
focuses on governmental actions or the declarant’s intentions, 
not on what right the accused was actually afforded. Returning 
to a comparison of the right to a jury trial, this shift in focus is 
                                                          
26 Jonakait, supra note 14, at 617–18. 
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akin to concluding that as long as the state did not do something 
to deny an accused a jury trial, his Sixth Amendment right was 
not violated, instead of asking, Did the accused get a jury trial? 
VI. IS BULGER A RALEIGH? 
The Confrontation Clause’s present interpretation is based on 
the curious use and reinvention of history. It ignores the 
methods used to interpret other Sixth Amendment provisions, 
and employs terms with idiosyncratic meanings, for which the 
Justices cannot agree on an application. But since the Court 
gives fealty to the proposition that trials like Sir Walter’s were 
meant to be forbidden, surely the search for and exclusion of 
testimonial hearsay prevents Raleigh-like trials. But does it, 
really? 
The Ohio Court of Appeals recently affirmed the conviction 
of Deon Bulger for the possession of a weapon. In a drug buy-
and-bust operation, Cleveland Detective Luther Roddy drove a 
person, identified in the appellate opinion as “the confidential 
reliable informant (‘CRI’),”27 to a buy site. Roddy parked his 
undercover car nearby. Another detective observed from a 
second vehicle. The officers saw the CRI approach a person 
later identified as Byron Turner in a residential driveway. The 
CRI quickly backed away from Turner and returned to Roddy’s 
car. Roddy asked, “Did you get anything?” The CRI responded 
that he had not and continued, “he pulled a gun on me and told 
me to get the f____ out of there, so I came right back to you.”28 
Roddy radioed for back up. A responding officer saw “Turner 
quickly take a dark object from his waistband and hand it to”29 
the defendant Bulger, who went into the house owned by 
Turner’s uncle.  
A few minutes later, the police found Bulger in the living 
room, apparently feigning sleep with his heart “beating really, 
                                                          
27 State v. Bulger, Nos. 94665, 94666, 94667, 2011 WL 3359861, 2011-
Ohio-3828U, ¶ 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2011). 
28 Id. ¶ 21. 
29 Id. ¶ 6. 
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really fast.”30 In the basement under the furnace, the police 
found a fully loaded, .9 millimeter gun. According to the 
testimony, the gun “was the size, shape, and color of the object 
the detectives had seen Turner display in his waistband.”31 
Turner’s grandmother indicated that Turner lived with her in a 
nearby house, and the police found .9 millimeter bullets in 
Turner’s bedroom. 
The CRI did not testify, but for convenience’s sake, let’s give 
him a name, perhaps Larry Cobham. The appellate opinion does not 
explain Cobham’s absence. As far as we know, he was available 
but, as a matter of strategy, the prosecution did not call him.  
Cobham’s statement about seeing Turner with a gun was 
admitted over a hearsay objection as a present sense impression. 
Surely, as the appellate court found, this was a correct ruling 
since Detective Roddy made clear that only moments elapsed 
between the time when Cobham perceived Turner and when he 
reported to the officer that Turner had a gun. 
The appellate court also ruled that the admission of 
Cobham’s statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause 
because it was not testimonial. Under present interpretations of 
that right, that also seems correct. Whether the statement “[h]e 
pulled a gun on me” is considered objectively from Cobham’s 
viewpoint, from the viewpoint of both the police and Cobham’s 
perspective simultaneously, or from the totality of the 
circumstances, the detective’s question and Cobham’s response 
did not have the primary purpose to prove past events relevant 
to a later criminal prosecution. This was not evidence collection. 
The statement was “not procured with a primary purpose of 
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”32 The 
Ohio court correctly stated, “The CRI could not have expected 
his statement to be used as evidence at trial. . . .”33 Instead, this 
was important information about a police operation in its midst 
that would affect its next actions. 
                                                          
30 State v. Turner, No. 94617, 2010 WL 5550255, 2010-Ohio-
6475, ¶ 46 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2010). 
31 Id. 
32 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
33 Bulger, 2011 WL 5550255, ¶ 22. 
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State v. Bulger is a minor case that correctly applies present 
doctrines and seems of little significance. On the other hand, 
perhaps it ought to make us wonder whether Raleigh’s trial has 
truly been banished. 
The CRI’s hearsay statement seems to have been essential to 
Bulger’s conviction. Police officers did testify that they saw 
Turner take an object from his waistband that bore a 
resemblance to the recovered weapon and hand it to Bulger. The 
police, however, did not state that they saw Turner pass a gun 
to Bulger. The gun was not discovered in Bulger’s immediate 
possession, but on a different floor from where he was found in 
a house that was not his residence and he did not own. No one 
testified that Bulger hid the gun or that he was familiar with the 
place where it was secreted. The bullets that matched the gun 
were not found where Bulger lived. Only if the trier of fact 
concluded that Turner handed Bulger a gun could it be rationally 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Bulger had possessed 
the recovered weapon. No in-court testimony established that, 
but the “confidential reliable informant’s” out-of-court assertion, 
if believed, did. Although this hearsay is not testimonial, and 
under present doctrine can be presented without cross-
examination, it surely provided an effective substitute for trial 
testimony. In other words, Bulger was seemingly convicted 
because of the unconfronted words of an anonymous police 
informant.  
Does this make Bulger’s case like Raleigh’s? Certainly 
differences can be found. If Raleigh’s case was unfair because 
the government sought to get hearsay from Cobham for later use 
at trial, or Cobham gave it for that purpose, then Bulger differs 
significantly from Raleigh’s trial. On the other hand, the two 
cases share the essential similarity of unconfronted out-of-court 
statements by government informants acting as effective, 
essential substitutes for trial testimony when no reason was 
given for the lack of in-court testimony. And on some level, 
Bulger’s case is more disturbing than Raleigh’s, since the 
hearsay against Bulger came from an anonymous informant. 
Sir Walter’s lament may very well have application in 
Bulger. Raleigh stated that “Cobham is absolutely in the King’s 
mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him, by accusing me he may 
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hope for favour. It is you, then Mr. Attorney, that should press 
his testimony, and I ought to fear his producing, if all that be 
true which you have alleged.” The confidential reliable 
informant may not have been as absolutely in the mercy of the 
government as Cobham was, but anyone with even superficial 
knowledge of our criminal justice system should not be surprised 
if an anonymous police informer sought favors from 
governmental power. He may have been “working off” his own 
arrest or getting paid. Like Cobham, his circumstances 
suggested that he would naturally incriminate the accused. Even 
so, like Cobham he was not called as a “witness,” and surely 
part of the reason for that is the prosecution expected to use his 
out-of-court statements without any right of confrontation. 
Any assumption that because the Confrontation Clause would 
prevent Raleigh’s trial, it would also prevent convictions based 
on the unconfronted words of anonymous police informants 
appears to be wrong. We can go further. If an undercover police 
officer reported to his partner in Bulger that a target had pulled 
a gun, the result should be the same. The hearsay of that 
undercover would not be “testimonial” and could be presented 
without confrontation. Furthermore, if two officers are in a 
patrol car on routine patrol, and one reports that a pedestrian 
they passed had pulled a gun and commands the driver to pull 
over, the police officer’s hearsay report should be admissible 
without showing that the officer was unavailable, as non-
testimonial, without any cross-examination. Although the 
undercover and the patrol officer may have been “eyewitnesses” 
to events important for a criminal prosecution, they are not 
“witnesses against” the accused. 
Curious, to say the least. 
CONCLUSION 
Confrontation Clause interpretations have contained many 
curiosities. Opinions have made historically inaccurate 
assertions. Raleigh’s trial has become a central myth with little 
basis for its selection and with little thought given to the myth’s 
meaning. Without explanation, the Clause has been interpreted 
differently from companion Sixth Amendment rights. 
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Interpretive terms have taken on unusual meanings, and trials 
like Raleigh’s may still be occurring. Perhaps it is really best to 
leave the various curiosities to the legal commentators of the 
Jefferson Airplane. 
When logic and proportion 
Have fallen sloppy dead 
And the White Knight is talking backwards 
And the Red Queen’s “off with her head!” 
Remember what the dormouse said: 
“Feed your head, Feed your head 
Feed your head”34 
                                                          
34 See White Rabbit, supra note 3. 
